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Abstract  
 
Current uses and application perspectives of Petri Nets (PNs) in the fields of risk analysis and accident modelling are 
discussed in this paper. Severe time and combinatory limitations are encountered when trying to model complex 
events sequences with classical methods. Due to their large calculation capabilities and the development of recent 
tools, the Petri Nets should be able to overcome these limitations: (1) Previous applications of PNs in the field of 
safety are reviewed and briefly discussed. Using a direct system description or the results of a Preliminary Hazards 
Analysis (PHA), authors have used PNs tools in order to get a variety of results such as, accident’s critical paths, 
safety or reliability data. (2) The tool’s capabilities are also highlighted through a translation catalogue, in which 
common concepts in safety are expressed in the Petri nets formalism. Either qualitative aspects of accident 
mechanisms or quantitative data, such as time logic or reliability calculations, may be processed in a Petri net. 
Despite  these promising examples and properties, safety oriented applications in the field of safety are still scarce. 
The lack of comprehensive tools available and PN inherent complexity may explain this situation. We can hope that 
the increasing attractiveness of PNs may somehow overcome these difficulties. As a matter of fact, due to the tool 
continuous development (i.e. recent SRN or Object-Oriented nets development), PNs may play a significant role in 
risk analysis or accident modelling in the future. 
 
Introduction 
 
Accident models and analysis methods 
 
Intuitively, accidents are perceived as due to a single cause or, at best, to a few determining factors. It is, for instance, 
quite common amongst both the public and authorities to consider being under the influence of alcohol while driving 
as a single cause of car accidents.  The domino theory, formally introduced by Heinrich in 1928, is a typical example 
of accident models, which reflects this perception. In the domino model, the accident process is considered to be a 
linear sequence of events. Although of limited consistency with regards to the current safety science standards, such 
viewpoint is still very common, especially from people involved in the accident process.  
More recently, the development of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) methods has originated several other accident 
models. Thus, the linear chain of events has evolved to a branched events chain and finally to a multilinear events 
sequence. Beside the development of these events-based models, remarkable accident theories, such as the 
catastrophe theory, have also been proposed.  
Despite the variety of the accident theories available at this time, models more complex than the branched events 
chain are seldom used in prospective accident analysis methods. The well-known Fault-tree analysis (FTA) or Event-
tree analysis (ETA) methods, are associated to the branched chain of events model, while the Hazard and Operability 
study (HAZOP) method considers accident sequences even less complex. It must be stressed that, due to their 
elementary theoretical background, these methods encounter some limitations when used to handle complex systems.  
Time modelling 
 
The limited use of classical methods becomes evident while simulating dynamic processes with time constraints. The 
FTA process is, for instance, only able to cope with trivial time logic, as each event entering a logical gate (a causal 
event) must occur before the outgoing event (a consequence). Time logic, especially concerning events duration, is 
not fully taken into account into fault or event-trees. Consequently, systems with dynamic constraint, such as 
concurrency or parallelism, cannot be depicted accurately in such ‘branched chain’ structures.  
It must be stressed that time representation is seldom a limiting factor in a retrospective (a posteriori) analysis, as the 
events have occurred in a ‘known’ order. Time may however become a problem in prospective (a priori) analysis, in 
which all of the relevant events sequences must be explored. Taking time logic into account may become very 
complex for processes involving ‘independent’ actors working concurrently. A transportation system is, for instance, 
a complex parallel system in which several actors (onboard or not) may act concurrently.  
Let us consider the case of train fire inside a tunnel. In such a case, there is a serious risk of fumes intoxication for the 
passengers due to the tunnel confinement. For the same reason, each accident actor (fire, passengers, crew, 
rescuers,...) has only a few possible courses of action. Despite this and despite  the remarkable constancy in the 
course of actions undertaken by each actor, the consequences of these fires differ significantly from one case to 
another. As a matter of fact, as shown by an examination of several cases, the accident outcome is strongly dependant 
of events order and events duration. The simulation of such accident process requires methods able to cope with 
complex time logic or, in other terms, methods based on timed accident theoretical models.  
Multilinear accident processes 
 
In the multilinear events sequence (MES) accident model, introduced by Hendrick and Benner (1986), the accident is 
depicted as a sequence of parallel events. The events of the accident process are positioned chronologically along 
lines. Each line being assigned to an actor of the accident.  
For a limited number of actors playing an active part in the accident process, the MES model is a powerful tool for 
accident investigation. The Sequentially Timed Events Plotting (STEP) method used for accident reconstruction in the 
field of transportation is a typical application of the MES model. Despite its successful uses in a posteriori 
investigations, it must be stressed that, the MES model is generally not applied in prospective analysis. As a matter of 
fact, complex models, such as the MES model or, on a smaller scope , such as the branched chain of events models 
cause combinatory problems. A prospective analysis based, for instance, on an FTA or STEP process may lead to an 
unmanageable number of possible accident paths. Limitations due to both combinatory and time logic management 
may somehow explain why events-based accident models have known little developments since Benner’s work in 
1975. 
On the other hand, recently developed computer tools seem able to overcome the limitations previously encountered. 
Indeed, computer assisted ETA or FTA calculations, Markov chains, or Petri Nets (PNs) have increased dramatically 
time representation and combinatory capabilities. Surprisingly, the two latest tools are mainly used for quantification 
purposes rather than for their accident modelling capabilities.  
A typical example of such application is the State Space Method (Brummer et al., 1994), in which Markov chains’ 
properties are used to calculate the reliability, availability or maintainability of the system. Although of great interest 
for quantitative analysis, the State of Space Method (SSM) is not used as a prospective analysis. Indeed, as a 
description of the system states is required in order to process calculation, all possible situations should be known 
prior to the SSM analysis. Similar problems are also encountered in methods on PNs use for fault-tree modelling (Liu 
and Chiou., 1997).  
It must also be pointed out that, neither Markov chains or Petri Nets methods does refer explicitly to known accident 
models theories.  
Petri Nets 
 
Defined by C.A. Petri in 1962, Petri nets are mathematical tools, which allow dynamic simulation of parallel and 
concurrent systems with time constraints. Designed originally for the computer-engineering field, Petri nets are now 
used for dynamic systems specification, description and verification in a wide range of applications. Dynamic 
systems modelling through Petri nets have encountered a large success and several new developments have been 
made since Dr. Petri’s early work. Some of these developments, such as hierarchical nets, Stochastic Petri Nets 
(SPN), or Coloured Petri Nets (CPN), are of utmost interest for safety-related applications. 
Formalism 
 
Formally, a PN may be described by a set of places, a set of transitions, a valuation function and an initial marking. 
For analytical computations, Petri nets are defined by means of linear algebra where vectors represents markings and 
matrices flow relations (Vidal-Naquet and Choquet-Genet, 1992). For convenience, a PN is generally depicted in a 
graphical structure where a circle represents a place and a thin rectangle represents a transition. Arrows and tokens 
respectively illustrate valuation functions and marking (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Functional and graphical description of PNs 
 
Places could be seen as conditions and transitions as events. The marking describes the state of the net. A 
precondition (specific marking), is required in order to fire the transition. When the transition is fired, the net reaches 
a new state, i.e., a new marking. 
Occurrence graph 
 
An occurrence graph is a structure describing all distinct states (markings) reachable during the net evolution. 
Distinct markings are illustrated as nodes in the occurrence graph, while labelled arcs are representing transitions 
(events) that produce the state evolution. Final states of the evolution are called dead nodes. The size of the 
occurrence graph may be expressed using its number of nodes. These graphs can be finite or infinite and 
mathematical techniques have been developed to analyse them by means of analytical methods or optimised 
simulation techniques. Explicit construction of the occurrence graph lead to untracktable complexity problems, quite 
a lot of techniques have been studied to reduce this combinatorial explosion either by coding set of states or by 
combining similar behaviours. See Buchs and Buffo (1999) for a thorough survey of the Petri nets analysis 
techniques. 
Extensions of the basic Petri net model 
 
Although the original model of Petri is often sufficient to model real systems, it rapidly appears that various 
extensions were necessary to take into account the needs for modeling of the average systems. Extensions have been 
proposed in the direction of expressiveness of repeated similar situations, time information, probability and 
structuring. We will shortly describe in the following sections the main innovative extensions of Petri nets. Current 
research is devoted to improve structuring and dynamicity of the basic model and to enrich the set of existing analysis 
techniques. 
Coloured Petri Nets 
Contrary to classical Petri nets, tokens may be differentiated in Coloured Petri Nets (CPN). In coloured nets, complex 
properties may be attributed to the tokens (numeric values, string of characters, etc.) by colors. The flow relation is 
modified accordingly to take into account the transition firing modes i.e. the color that is used to fire a transition. 
Timed Petri Nets 
In timed Petri nets (TPNs), time logic is taken into account by the use of firing times or duration. While only a 
specific marking is required in a basic PN for a transition firing, time constraints are included in TPNs. 
Stochastic Petri Nets 
There are several possibilities to include delay timed firing conditions in the net. If the delay is a random distribution 
function, the resulting net class is called Stochastic Petri Net (SPN). 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets 
Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) are like SPN but include also immediate transitions. Once enabled, the 
immediate transitions are fired in zero time. They are very useful for modelling an activity with negligible delay 
compared with other exponential transitions. 
Stochastic Reward Nets 
In order to describe the system dependability, GSPN were extended with new features to create Stochastic Reward 
Nets (SRN). These nets include enabling functions, timed transition priorities, variable cardinality arcs, halting 
condition, and reward rates. 
Modular or Object-Oriented Nets 
The intensive use of Petri nets in large projects naturally leads researchers to propose new concepts to manage the 
complexity of the Petri nets that are used in these systems. Moreover, openness and dynamic creation/destruction of 
entities are characteristics of the modern software systems. Hierarchical nets are the first attempt to introduce 
structure in nets. Unfortunately, dynamic evolutions  are not very well supported in these approaches. With the rapid 
emergence of Object-Orientation (that quite naturally take these aspects into account), various approaches have been 
proposed to give an object-oriented structuring to Petri nets. See (Guelfi et al., 1997) for a comparative study of the 
Object-Oriented approach and (Buffo and Buchs, 1997) for a description of the most common approaches in this 
field. More recently, components have been introduced in these Object Oriented models (Buchs and Guelfi, 2000; 
Biberstein et al., 2001) that enable us to enrich Petri nets with consideration about the architecture of the system i.e. 
the way components are organized and how they communicate. 
Use of Petri nets in safety 
 
Petri nets, as tools for discrete events simulation, are of utmost interest in safety. Dynamic changes in the Petri nets 
are induced by transition firing during simulation. Firing of one or several transitions changes the net marking or, in 
other terms, induces a discrete change of state. Thus, dynamic properties of Petri nets such as parallel firing, 
successive firing, or firing of concurrent transitions may be used to simulate complex events sequences. 
These last years, several authors have investigated the use of Petri Nets for safety-related applications. A brief review 
of some of these applications is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Use of PNs tools in the field of safety 
 
Towards Petri nets modelling  
 
Current uses and application perspectives of Petri Nets PNs in the fields of risk analysis and accident modelling are 
discussed in this paper. As other authors have already studied extensively PNs’ calculations perspectives (see Table 
1), this work has been focused on qualitative rather than quantitative modelling.  
The properties of PNs for modelling functions or elements commonly used in the field of risk analysis have been 
investigated. A translation catalogue between the Petri nets formalism and the safety science is proposed. A special 
emphasis is given on linking the CPNs tool with known concepts and accidents theoretical models.  
Petri nets formalism vs. Safety 
 
Petri nets have been known since the early sixties, but they are still used at a limited extent in the field of safety. Due 
to their hermetic formalism and the lack of comprehensive tools available, PNs are often considered by the safety 
science community as made for and used exclusively by computer scientists. The idea of describing discrete events 
through places and transitions is quite easy to grasp. Still, it doesn’t help to understand how to apply it in the field of 
safety. 
In order to give some insight of the PNs potential for safety-oriented applications, the problem can be considered 
from the safety science viewpoint. Despite  bending existing PNs structures for safety purposes, let’s consider first 
concepts and functions commonly used in risk analysis or accident modelling.  
As shown in Table 2, a translation into the PN formalism exists for a number of these functions. It must be 
emphasised that, due to the versatile nature of PNs tools, other translations than those presented in Table 2 may exist.  
Table 2. Translations of safety concepts into PN structures 
 
Discussion  
 
Using PNs in safety related applications 
 
Although far from exhaustive, the translation catalogue presented in Table 2 highlights the tremendous possibilities of 
PNs. First, as PNs’ tools are generic, a large number of concepts and functions may be modelled through their 
formalism. Indeed, many concepts currently used in risk analysis methods based on event-sequences accident theories 
may be implemented in PNs structures. Secondly, PNs do suffer fewer limitations regarding combinatory 
management and function/concepts combination than classical methods. Given the appropriate PN tool, it is therefore 
possible to expand significantly the boundaries of a risk analysis.  
It is for instance possible, using a timed CPN, to model altogether time constraint, parallelism and cause to 
consequences relationships (including divergent consequences). While unmanageable with many classical tools, such 
combination of functions may be simulated in a PN structure containing up to several hundred thousand states (the 
number of occurrence graph nodes). Considering the element being modelled, four possible uses of PNs in the field 
of safety may be distinguished: 
Objects and modes modelling  
Petri nets have been designed in order to model the behaviour of dynamic systems. Thus the most straightforward 
way to use them is to model a physical system such as manufacturing processes (Rudas and Horvath, 1997; Wang and 
Wu, 1998). As all the reachable states of the net are explored during the simulation process, system instabilities and 
blocking situations are revealed. To produce safety or reliability information about the system being modelled is a 
general propriety of PNs . When a physical or logical system is modelled without emphasis on safety, this property 
comes as a spin off of the simulation process. Numerous examples of applications without special emphasis on safety 
are reported in literature and have therefore not been presented in Table 1. 
Despite the PNs intrinsic properties regarding safety, safety-oriented uses are still scarce. Amongst other causes, the 
computer tools’ development required may explain the lack of applications reported in this field. Indeed, both net 
structure and simulation analysis tools must be specifically designed or adapted to get safety and reliability data.  
Still, a safety-oriented use of PN is of utmost interest. It allows inductive processing while taking account of complex 
cause to consequence relationships between events. Compared to classical method, such PN analysis may be 
assimilated to an expanded FMEA or HAZOP procedure in which parallelism and concurrency are taken into 
account. While in classical methods, consequences of a single deviation are propagated through the system, all the 
objects’ functioning modes in PNs are considered simultaneously.  
Accident modelling  
From a functional viewpoint, a desired event cannot be distinguished from an undesired one, except that their 
probabilities of occurrence may differ considerably. Thus, rather than modelling a physical or functional system, it is 
possible to model the accident events’ sequence itself in order to get safety data. 
In such accident modelling, possible combinations of events are explored in a systematic way. By analogy with 
known methods, it may be compared to build a prospective STEP analysis. Combining Benner’s multilinear sequence 
model with cause to consequences branching (OR causal gates or divergent consequences branching) may produce 
elaborated accident scenarios. Although of utmost interest, this method does suffer limitations in its applications. As a 
matter of facts, all the significant events of the accident process must be known in order to build the PN structure, 
which may require previous accident analysis or risk analysis processes.  
State of space modelling   
In the state of space method, stochastic nets are used in order to get quantitative data about the system reliability, 
availability and maintainability. The dynamic modelling capability of SPN does indeed allow calculations of complex 
systems.  
It must be stressed, however, that the state space method is a calculation process rather than a risk analysis. As a 
matter of fact, all the significant states of the system must be known prior to modelling. Thus, the state of space 
method may be applied to well-known systems or to quantify the results of a previous risk analysis.  
Fault and event-tree modelling   
Several authors (Liu and Chiou, 1997; Yang and Liu, 1998) have pointed out the possible analogies between fault-
trees and the PNs structures. Translating a fault or event-tree in a net structure does not constitute a risk analysis 
process as a previous analysis is, here also, required.  
Despite these limitations, this method opens perspectives for future applications. Indeed, combining a physical or 
functional description of the system with a fault or event-tree generator may be of great interest.  
CPN Applications  
 
Modelling accident processes in a transportation system  
 
Context. In order to predict possible accident scenarios in the Swissmetro, a high-speed underground train planned 
for interurban linking in Switzerland, PNs modelling capabilities have been investigated. Roughly speaking, the 
future Swissmetro system may be compared to a subway or a train in tunnels. This comparison is somewhat 
oversimplified as the Swissmetro presents a unique combination of hazards, usually encountered in either ground or 
air transportation. Thus, even if the experience acquired through previous accident cases may be of interest, the use of 
a prospective analysis method is required.  
Approach. A STEP analysis has been conduced on several accident cases, which had occurred in similar systems 
(railway tunnel accidents). Surprisingly, it has appeared that: (1) the number of actors and events which may affect 
significantly the accident process is quite limited, (2) the time of occurrence or the duration of events is a key factor 
in such accident processes.  
Relevant actors, events and causal relationships, identified during the retrospective STEP process, have been 
translated into the Petri net formalism. During simulation, one of the possible events succession is processed. Rather 
than investigating each accident scenario separately, the overall simulation results are examined through the 
occurrence graph, which recapitulate the reachable states allowed by the net structure. Interesting states may be 
investigated systematically, using the software built-in functions for occurrence graph nodes analysis. The approach 
used, which is briefly presented in Figure 2, may be perceived as a prospective STEP analysis. The calculation of 
the occurrence graph generates all possible sequence of events (or transitions), achievable in a multilinear accident 
process. 
Figure 2. Principle of accident modelling 
 
The model has been implemented on Design CPN (version 3.04, for Unix) software. Events, actors and cause-to-
consequence relationships pointed out during the previous STEP analysis have been used to built the basic Petri net 
structure. Each actor of the accident process is depicted by a place in the net structure. Each token is coloured with a 
couple of values: A qualitative argument (the actor’s action or situation) and a quantitative argument (the time of 
occurrence of the event). Only a limited number of possible events have been taken into account (about 20). 
The PN structure describing one of the accidents actors (the passengers) is presented in Figure 3. It must be stressed 
that this example is somehow trivial, as the transitions are not depicted in a detailed way (time logic, input and output 
conditions). Each actor is depicted by a single place and a set of possible transitions. Each transition is dedicated to 
one of the possible events which may affect the actor. The passengers may, for instance, initiate a fire fighting action, 
assuming that there is an ignition and that a fire extinguisher is available. Thus, the fire fighting event is linked to two 
other actors: the fire and to the vehicle. Even if the right conditions are fulfilled, the fire fighting action may not be 
undertaken by the passengers. Two concurrent events may occurs in such a situation: (1) the passengers fight the fire 
until extinction or until it growth out of hands (2) for some reason no fire fighting is undertaken and the passengers 
are available for another action. 
 
Figure 3. Modelling an actor of the accident process through Design CPN 
 
Results. Despite the limited size of the net used, the simulation of the net structure leads to a large number of distinct 
scenarios. Modifying parameters, such as initial marking (initial accident conditions), time logic or cause to 
consequences relationships, while keeping the same number of events, leads to occurrence graph size ranging from 
101 to 5.104 nodes.  
Both net structure and simulation conditions must be chosen carefully in order to avoid occurrence graph outgrowing. 
As an example, Table 3 shows the occurrence graph’s size resulting of a Petri net simulation according to two modes 
of time logic. 
Table 3. Occurrence graphs size for several accident modelling 
 Accident scenarios have been interpreted in a more elaborate way, using Design CPN built-in functions to examine 
occurrence graph nodes. The results obtained are coherent regarding both previous tunnel accidents and tunnel safety 
principles (Vernez, 1999b). 
 
Modelling health risks induced by man-technical workplace interactions (MORM project) 
 
Context. The modelling of industrial processes through Petri nets to address OH&s concern in a systematic way is 
currently investigated. This project, which has started the year 2000, has the following goals. (1) to develop a model 
to describe a technical workplace dynamics ; (2) to establish, using known models in human cognitive behaviour, a 
man-at-work description ; (3) to develop a prototype tool for modelling and analysing occupational hazard due to the 
man-workplace interactions; and (4) to develop and to validate a user interface designed for occupational and safety 
specialists. The PN structures are built using the COOPN software tool (Biberstein, 2001) 
Approach. As shown in Figure 4, the workplaces have been separated in three parts: a flow of material, one or 
several machines, and the human operator. The flow of material, which links the machines of the same process, is 
used to depict the operating sequence. The machines are perceived as entities which may induce changes to the flow 
properties (temperature, shape, weight,…).  
The human actor is modeled in a rather implicit way. Indeed, each machine is linked to a set of possible actions, 
which can be undertaken by the human operator. Correct actions can easily be deduced from the machine’s 
properties, while the CREAM cognitive model (Hollnagel 1998) is used to establish the set of possible errors. The 
human operator is modelled as a set of possible transitions, which may change the machine states, rather than as a 
Petri net in itself. CREAM is only used in a qualitative sense at the present time, but a quantitative analysis is 
intended in the MORM project.  
Two types of man-machine interactions are considered. (1) The chronic and acute risks associated with the machines’ 
states, which may affect the worker. (2) By remote control or direct (manual) operation, the worker may induce a 
change of state in the machine. This action may be either an action intended in the normal operating procedure, a 
corrective action or an error. An overview of the model is presented in the Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Principle of OH&S risks modelling through PNs 
 
The machine was modelled using a physical state description. Every state (normal and degraded) was identified and 
related by transitions (e.g. advance to blocking).  
Possible acute and chronic occupational risks (e.g. electrocution, electrosmog, cutting, chemical, etc.) are associated 
with the machines' states. Acute effects are modelled with new transitions that are attached to machine state (e.g. 
electrocution at breakdown). Chronic effects are modelled as new places that are filled up when some transitions are 
fired (e.g. electrosmog dose received at normal state), until a threshold is reached. 
Results. At the present time, data on industrial machine are collected in order to build the corresponding PNs 
structures. Simulations have not been performed yet, but an example of the PNs developed to depict an industrial 
wire making process may give some insight of the project outcomes.  
The aim of this industrial process is to produce metal wires from large metal billets. Metal billets are passed through 
a conveyor and distributed between three parallel stock slides. In the next step, the billets are heated in induction 
furnaces. When the correct temperature is reached, a hydraulic piston pushes the billet out of the furnace. The same 
piston brings the next billet from the corresponding stock slide. Another conveyor brings the red-hot billets to a 
hydraulic press. The billets are then pressed, at 200 atm, into metal wires. 
Figure 5. A schematic representation of the wire making process 
The metal wire making process is partly automated. The operator starts the sequence and then controls the operations 
through an indicator panel with electric commands. However, the operator or its co-workers still perform several 
tasks manually such as: (1) extracting hot billets from the furnace when the temperature is reached (based on the 
temperature value given on the panel); (2) starting the pressing sequence; and (3) separating the metallic residues 
adhering on the joint after pressing.  
A schematic view of the PN state space obtained for an induction furnace is presented in Figure 6. For practical 
reasons, the possible human errors are not depicted here. Changes (PN transitions) in the possible machine states are 
linked to two external actors: the incoming material flows and the furnace operator.  The furnace-degraded states 
(breakdown, overheating) may be linked to external situations, in which chronic occupational risks are of concern. 
 
Figure 6. Modeling an induction furnace through COOPN 
 
Although structured as a machine state-space, the PN model intended in the MORM project does both man-machine 
and man-flux interactions. As a matter of fact, a machine description does include the machine state-space itself, 
but is also directly linked to external events. Such events may be for instance; (1) normal actions, corrective actions 
or possible errors from the operator; (2) changes due to the incoming material flow and (3) occurrence of situations 
due to a machine degraded state (e.g. an EMF emission due to a furnace overheating).  
 
Conclusions 
 
The perspectives of PN applications to the field of risk analysis and accident modelling have been discussed in this 
paper. The possible "translations" of key concepts or functions used in safety sciences into the Petri Net formalism 
suggest tremendous possibilities. Indeed, either qualitative aspects of accident mechanisms or quantitative data, such 
as time logic or reliability calculations, may be processed in a Petri Net. This huge potential is also suggested by the 
wide range of previous applications made in the field of safety. Using a direct system description or the results of a 
Preliminary Hazards Analysis (PHA), authors have used PNs tools in order to get a variety of results such as, 
accident’s critical paths, safety or reliability data.  
Despite this, it must be stressed that safety-oriented applications are still scarce. The lack of comprehensive tools 
available and PN inherent complexity may explain this situation. We can hope that, the increasing attractiveness of 
PNs may somehow overcome these difficulties. As a matter of fact, due to the tool continuous development (i.e., 
recent SRN or Object-oriented nets developments), PNs may play a significant role in risk analysis or accident 
modelling in the future. 
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Figure 1. Functional and graphical description of PNs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a). transition before firing 
(b). transition after firing 
final marking  
(0;1) 
T1 P1 P2 
Initial marking  
(1;0) 
P1 P2 T1 
P  {P1...Pm} = set of places 
T  {T1...Tn} = set of transitions 
W = valuation function P T (TP dans ) 
M0 = initial marking  
W(Pi,Tj) = precondition of a transition (number of 
token necessary in place i to fire the transition j) 
W(Tj,Pi) = post condition of a transition (number of 
token given to place i after firing the transition j) 
Figure 2. Principle of accident modelling 
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Figure 3. Modelling an actor of the accident process through Design CPN 
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 Figure 4. Principle of OH&S risks modelling through PNs 
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Figure 5. A schematic representation of the wire making process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Modeling an induction furnace through COOPN 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Use of PNs tools in the field of safety 
 
Reference Required Modelled Petri Net Results 
El Koursi, 1992 Physical description State of space PN Safety data 
Brummer et al., 1994 System states State of space PN Safety data 
Malhotra and Trivedi, 
1995 
Cause-to-consequences 
relationships 
Events and logical gates GSPN - 
SRN 
Failure data 
Balakrishnan and 
Trivedi, 1996 
System states State of space SRN Reliability data and 
critical paths 
Katsumata et al., 1996 System states State of space PN Failure diagnosis 
Szücs et al., 1996 Physical description Objects, modes, and failure 
modes 
CPN Critical pathways 
Cordier et al., 1997 System states State of space SPN Reliability data 
Dutuit et al., 1997 System states State of space with 
stochastic transitions 
SPN Reliability data 
Ereau et al., 1997 System states State of space with 
stochastic transitions 
Timed PN Reliability data 
Liu and Chiou, 1997 Cause-to-consequences 
relationships 
Events and logical gates PN Failure data 
Marier et al., 1997 System states State of space with 
stochastic transitions 
GSPN Reliability data 
Rochdi et al., 1999 Cause-to-consequences 
relationships 
Events and logical gates PN Failure data 
Rudas and Horvath, 
1997 
Physical description Objects and modes PN Dynamic behaviour data 
Yoshikawa et al., 1997 System states State of space CPN Safety data 
Srinavasan and 
Venkatasubramanian, 
1998a and 1998b 
System states State of space PN Safety data 
Wang and Wu, 1998 Physical description Objects and modes CPN Dynamic behaviour data 
Yang and Liu, 1998 Cause-to-consequences 
relationships 
Events and logical gates PN Failure data 
Vernez, 1999a and 
1999b 
Cause-to-consequences 
relationships 
Accident events sequences CPN Safety data, critical 
paths  
Kontogiannis et al., 
2000 
System states State of space PN Reliability data and 
critical paths 
Table 2. Translations of safety concepts into PN structures 
 
Function/ 
concept 
Comment  PN structure Description 
(a) Qualitative aspects    
Discrete event Discrete event are used in 
event-based methods to 
describe the occurrence 
of a sudden event, which 
my change the system 
state. 
 Transition firing 
 
 
P1 
T1
 
P2 
1` 
1` 
P1 
T1 
P2 
1` 
1` 
 
 
Firing a transition consumes 
token(s) from incoming 
place(s) and produce token(s) 
to outgoing places. The change 
of marking does change the 
state of the net. 
Qualitative 
state/mode  
A qualitative description 
of a component or a 
subsystem state is 
commonly used in 
inductive methods (such 
as a failure mode in 
FMEA) 
 Place name 
 
 
P1 
P1 = failure 
P2 = fire 
P2 
 
 
Naming a PN place adds a 
qualitative argument to the 
system state 
 Token’s colour 
 
 
P1 
= (failure, 0.023) 
= (fire, 0.0001) 
 
 
In a coloured net, tokens are 
differentiated through 
labelling. The argument used 
for labelling may contain 
either qualitative or 
quantitative data. From a 
functional viewpoint, a 
coloured net is a synthetic way 
to express a classical net with 
labelled places.  
Divergent 
consequences 
In an event-tree (or a 
decision tree), an event 
with several possible 
outcomes is expressed, 
using a divergent 
branching in the event 
sequence. 
 Conflicting transitions 
 
 P1 
P2 
1` 
1` 
T2 
P3 
1` 
1` 
T1 
 
 
Transitions requiring common 
resources to be fired are 
conflicting. Only one of the 
conflicting transitions will be 
fired while processing the PN 
structure. The resulting 
occurrence graph will display a 
branching in the sequence of 
accessible states.  
Causal 
relationship 
The prime logical 
function used in either 
deductive or inductive 
RA methods is the cause 
to consequence 
relationship. 
Consequence events may 
happen only when causal 
events have occurred. 
 Transition conditions 
 
 P1 
1`x 
P2 
1`y 
T1 
GUARD EXPRESSION 
X=… andalso Y=… 
 
 
 
Several ways may be used in 
PN structures to set conditions 
to a transition firing: 
a) incoming arcs may be used 
to define prerequisite 
conditions (markings) to a 
firing 
b) some PN tools allow the use 
of transitions with code 
expressions. Complex firing 
conditions may be introduced 
in code expressions (for 
instance with the use of 
Boolean logic)  
Logical gates Logical gates are used to 
describe causes to 
consequences 
relationships in a Boolean 
way. A logical gate is 
required when the 
occurrence of an event 
depends on a 
combination of previous 
conditions or events.  
AND or OR logical gates 
are commonly used in 
deductive RA methods, 
such as FTA. 
 Code expression 
 
 1`x 
  
P3 
  
1`y 
T1 
  
CODE 
EXPRESSION 
z  = f (x,y) 1`z 
 
  
In CPNs, the colour of the 
token(s) produced by a 
transition firing may be 
defined in a code expression. 
Boolean logic or algebraic 
calculations may be used in a 
code expression.  
Parallel events 
sequences 
Events without direct 
cause to consequences 
relationships may occur 
in a simultaneously, 
leading to parallel events 
sequences.  
Modelling parallel 
sequences in a detailed 
way is of utmost interest 
in system with time 
constraints. 
 Concurrent transitions 
 
 
P1 
1` 
1` 
P2 
T2 
P3 
1` 
1` 
T1 
 
 
Concurrent transitions, which 
are not conflicting, are fired 
simultaneously while 
processing PN structures.  
 Timed PNs 
 
 
P1 
P2 
1` 
1` 
P1 
P2 
1` 
1` 
(t) 
T1 (t) T1 (t) 
(t + t)  
 
In timed PNs, time constraints 
may be simulated, while 
attaching duration to 
transitions firing.  
  
(b) Quantitative aspects  
   
Failure ratio Either event frequency or 
probability is used in 
quantitative RA methods, 
such as FTA, in order to 
calculate a top event 
occurrence.  
 Token’s colour 
 
 
P1 
= (failure, 0.023) 
= (fire, 0.0001) 
 
 
In a coloured net, tokens are 
differentiated through 
labelling. The argument used 
for labelling may contain 
either qualitative or 
quantitative data. From a 
functional viewpoint, a 
coloured net is a synthetic way 
to express a classical net with 
labelled places. 
 Stochastic nets In stochastic nets, an 
occurrence probability is 
attributed to transitions. 
 
(c) Analysing / processing  
   
Possible 
accident paths 
The goal of many event-
based RA methods is to 
establish all possible 
accident paths in a 
qualitative and/or 
quantitative way.  
 Occurrence graph 
 
 
 
 
Processing a PN structure does 
generate an occurrence graph, 
which describes all reachable 
states (markings) of the net.  
 
Table 3. Occurrence graphs size for several accident modelling  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Simulation 
conditions 
Numb. of 
nodes 
Numb. of 
death nodes 
all events, fuzzy 
time 
48’975 6533 
all events, fixed 
time 
1’857 361 
 
